Replaced system SQLite with SQLCipher to support encrypted database
This commit is contained in:
235
Sources/DataLiteC/libtomcrypt/pk/dsa/dsa_generate_pqg.c
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235
Sources/DataLiteC/libtomcrypt/pk/dsa/dsa_generate_pqg.c
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/* LibTomCrypt, modular cryptographic library -- Tom St Denis */
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/* SPDX-License-Identifier: Unlicense */
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#include "tomcrypt_private.h"
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#pragma clang diagnostic push
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#pragma clang diagnostic ignored "-Wconversion"
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#pragma clang diagnostic ignored "-Wshorten-64-to-32"
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/**
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@file dsa_generate_pqg.c
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DSA implementation - generate DSA parameters p, q & g
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*/
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#ifdef LTC_MDSA
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/**
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Create DSA parameters (INTERNAL ONLY, not part of public API)
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@param prng An active PRNG state
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@param wprng The index of the PRNG desired
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@param group_size Size of the multiplicative group (octets)
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@param modulus_size Size of the modulus (octets)
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@param p [out] bignum where generated 'p' is stored (must be initialized by caller)
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@param q [out] bignum where generated 'q' is stored (must be initialized by caller)
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@param g [out] bignum where generated 'g' is stored (must be initialized by caller)
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@return CRYPT_OK if successful, upon error this function will free all allocated memory
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*/
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static int s_dsa_make_params(prng_state *prng, int wprng, int group_size, int modulus_size, void *p, void *q, void *g)
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{
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unsigned long L, N, n, outbytes, seedbytes, counter, j, i;
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int err, res, mr_tests_q, mr_tests_p, found_p, found_q, hash;
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unsigned char *wbuf, *sbuf, digest[MAXBLOCKSIZE];
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void *t2L1, *t2N1, *t2q, *t2seedlen, *U, *W, *X, *c, *h, *e, *seedinc;
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const char *accepted_hashes[] = { "sha3-512", "sha512", "sha3-384", "sha384", "sha3-256", "sha256" };
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/* check size */
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if (group_size > LTC_MDSA_MAX_GROUP || group_size < 1 || group_size >= modulus_size || modulus_size > LTC_MDSA_MAX_MODULUS) {
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return CRYPT_INVALID_ARG;
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}
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/* FIPS-186-4 A.1.1.2 Generation of the Probable Primes p and q Using an Approved Hash Function
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*
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* L = The desired length of the prime p (in bits e.g. L = 1024)
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* N = The desired length of the prime q (in bits e.g. N = 160)
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* seedlen = The desired bit length of the domain parameter seed; seedlen shallbe equal to or greater than N
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* outlen = The bit length of Hash function
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*
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* 1. Check that the (L, N)
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* 2. If (seedlen <N), then return INVALID.
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* 3. n = ceil(L / outlen) - 1
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* 4. b = L- 1 - (n * outlen)
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* 5. domain_parameter_seed = an arbitrary sequence of seedlen bits
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* 6. U = Hash (domain_parameter_seed) mod 2^(N-1)
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* 7. q = 2^(N-1) + U + 1 - (U mod 2)
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* 8. Test whether or not q is prime as specified in Appendix C.3
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* 9. If qis not a prime, then go to step 5.
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* 10. offset = 1
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* 11. For counter = 0 to (4L- 1) do {
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* For j=0 to n do {
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* Vj = Hash ((domain_parameter_seed+ offset + j) mod 2^seedlen
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* }
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* W = V0 + (V1 *2^outlen) + ... + (Vn-1 * 2^((n-1) * outlen)) + ((Vn mod 2^b) * 2^(n * outlen))
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* X = W + 2^(L-1) Comment: 0 <= W < 2^(L-1); hence 2^(L-1) <= X < 2^L
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* c = X mod 2*q
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* p = X - (c - 1) Comment: p ~ 1 (mod 2*q)
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* If (p >= 2^(L-1)) {
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* Test whether or not p is prime as specified in Appendix C.3.
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* If p is determined to be prime, then return VALID and the values of p, qand (optionally) the values of domain_parameter_seed and counter
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* }
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* offset = offset + n + 1 Comment: Increment offset
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* }
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*/
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seedbytes = group_size;
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L = (unsigned long)modulus_size * 8;
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N = (unsigned long)group_size * 8;
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/* XXX-TODO no Lucas test */
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#ifdef LTC_MPI_HAS_LUCAS_TEST
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/* M-R tests (when followed by one Lucas test) according FIPS-186-4 - Appendix C.3 - table C.1 */
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mr_tests_p = (L <= 2048) ? 3 : 2;
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if (N <= 160) { mr_tests_q = 19; }
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else if (N <= 224) { mr_tests_q = 24; }
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else { mr_tests_q = 27; }
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#else
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/* M-R tests (without Lucas test) according FIPS-186-4 - Appendix C.3 - table C.1 */
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if (L <= 1024) { mr_tests_p = 40; }
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else if (L <= 2048) { mr_tests_p = 56; }
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else { mr_tests_p = 64; }
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if (N <= 160) { mr_tests_q = 40; }
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else if (N <= 224) { mr_tests_q = 56; }
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else { mr_tests_q = 64; }
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#endif
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hash = -1;
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for (i = 0; i < sizeof(accepted_hashes)/sizeof(accepted_hashes[0]); ++i) {
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hash = find_hash(accepted_hashes[i]);
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if (hash != -1) break;
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}
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if (hash == -1) {
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return CRYPT_INVALID_ARG; /* no appropriate hash function found */
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}
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if (N > hash_descriptor[hash].hashsize * 8) {
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return CRYPT_INVALID_ARG; /* group_size too big */
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}
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if ((err = hash_is_valid(hash)) != CRYPT_OK) { return err; }
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outbytes = hash_descriptor[hash].hashsize;
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n = ((L + outbytes*8 - 1) / (outbytes*8)) - 1;
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if ((wbuf = XMALLOC((n+1)*outbytes)) == NULL) { err = CRYPT_MEM; goto cleanup3; }
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if ((sbuf = XMALLOC(seedbytes)) == NULL) { err = CRYPT_MEM; goto cleanup2; }
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err = ltc_mp_init_multi(&t2L1, &t2N1, &t2q, &t2seedlen, &U, &W, &X, &c, &h, &e, &seedinc, LTC_NULL);
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if (err != CRYPT_OK) { goto cleanup1; }
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if ((err = ltc_mp_2expt(t2L1, L-1)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto cleanup; }
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/* t2L1 = 2^(L-1) */
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if ((err = ltc_mp_2expt(t2N1, N-1)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto cleanup; }
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/* t2N1 = 2^(N-1) */
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if ((err = ltc_mp_2expt(t2seedlen, seedbytes*8)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto cleanup; }
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/* t2seedlen = 2^seedlen */
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for(found_p=0; !found_p;) {
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/* q */
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for(found_q=0; !found_q;) {
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if (prng_descriptor[wprng].read(sbuf, seedbytes, prng) != seedbytes) { err = CRYPT_ERROR_READPRNG; goto cleanup; }
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i = outbytes;
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if ((err = hash_memory(hash, sbuf, seedbytes, digest, &i)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto cleanup; }
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if ((err = ltc_mp_read_unsigned_bin(U, digest, outbytes)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto cleanup; }
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if ((err = ltc_mp_mod(U, t2N1, U)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto cleanup; }
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if ((err = ltc_mp_add(t2N1, U, q)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto cleanup; }
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if (!ltc_mp_isodd(q)) ltc_mp_add_d(q, 1, q);
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if ((err = ltc_mp_prime_is_prime(q, mr_tests_q, &res)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto cleanup; }
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if (res == LTC_MP_YES) found_q = 1;
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}
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/* p */
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if ((err = ltc_mp_read_unsigned_bin(seedinc, sbuf, seedbytes)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto cleanup; }
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if ((err = ltc_mp_add(q, q, t2q)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto cleanup; }
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for(counter=0; counter < 4*L && !found_p; counter++) {
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for(j=0; j<=n; j++) {
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if ((err = ltc_mp_add_d(seedinc, 1, seedinc)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto cleanup; }
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if ((err = ltc_mp_mod(seedinc, t2seedlen, seedinc)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto cleanup; }
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/* seedinc = (seedinc+1) % 2^seed_bitlen */
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if ((i = ltc_mp_unsigned_bin_size(seedinc)) > seedbytes) { err = CRYPT_INVALID_ARG; goto cleanup; }
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zeromem(sbuf, seedbytes);
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if ((err = ltc_mp_to_unsigned_bin(seedinc, sbuf + seedbytes-i)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto cleanup; }
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i = outbytes;
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err = hash_memory(hash, sbuf, seedbytes, wbuf+(n-j)*outbytes, &i);
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if (err != CRYPT_OK) { goto cleanup; }
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}
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if ((err = ltc_mp_read_unsigned_bin(W, wbuf, (n+1)*outbytes)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto cleanup; }
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if ((err = ltc_mp_mod(W, t2L1, W)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto cleanup; }
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if ((err = ltc_mp_add(W, t2L1, X)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto cleanup; }
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if ((err = ltc_mp_mod(X, t2q, c)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto cleanup; }
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if ((err = ltc_mp_sub_d(c, 1, p)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto cleanup; }
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if ((err = ltc_mp_sub(X, p, p)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto cleanup; }
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if (ltc_mp_cmp(p, t2L1) != LTC_MP_LT) {
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/* p >= 2^(L-1) */
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if ((err = ltc_mp_prime_is_prime(p, mr_tests_p, &res)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto cleanup; }
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if (res == LTC_MP_YES) {
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found_p = 1;
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}
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}
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}
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}
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/* FIPS-186-4 A.2.1 Unverifiable Generation of the Generator g
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* 1. e = (p - 1)/q
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* 2. h = any integer satisfying: 1 < h < (p - 1)
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* h could be obtained from a random number generator or from a counter that changes after each use
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* 3. g = h^e mod p
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* 4. if (g == 1), then go to step 2.
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*
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*/
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if ((err = ltc_mp_sub_d(p, 1, e)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto cleanup; }
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if ((err = ltc_mp_div(e, q, e, c)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto cleanup; }
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/* e = (p - 1)/q */
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i = ltc_mp_count_bits(p);
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do {
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do {
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if ((err = rand_bn_bits(h, i, prng, wprng)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto cleanup; }
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} while (ltc_mp_cmp(h, p) != LTC_MP_LT || ltc_mp_cmp_d(h, 2) != LTC_MP_GT);
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if ((err = ltc_mp_sub_d(h, 1, h)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto cleanup; }
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/* h is randon and 1 < h < (p-1) */
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if ((err = ltc_mp_exptmod(h, e, p, g)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto cleanup; }
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} while (ltc_mp_cmp_d(g, 1) == LTC_MP_EQ);
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err = CRYPT_OK;
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cleanup:
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ltc_mp_deinit_multi(t2L1, t2N1, t2q, t2seedlen, U, W, X, c, h, e, seedinc, LTC_NULL);
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cleanup1:
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XFREE(sbuf);
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cleanup2:
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XFREE(wbuf);
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cleanup3:
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return err;
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}
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/**
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Generate DSA parameters p, q & g
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@param prng An active PRNG state
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@param wprng The index of the PRNG desired
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@param group_size Size of the multiplicative group (octets)
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@param modulus_size Size of the modulus (octets)
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@param key [out] Where to store the created key
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@return CRYPT_OK if successful.
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*/
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int dsa_generate_pqg(prng_state *prng, int wprng, int group_size, int modulus_size, dsa_key *key)
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{
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int err;
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/* init key */
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if ((err = dsa_int_init(key)) != CRYPT_OK) return err;
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/* generate params */
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err = s_dsa_make_params(prng, wprng, group_size, modulus_size, key->p, key->q, key->g);
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if (err != CRYPT_OK) {
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goto cleanup;
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}
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key->qord = group_size;
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return CRYPT_OK;
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cleanup:
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dsa_free(key);
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return err;
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}
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#endif
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#pragma clang diagnostic pop
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